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Executive Summary 
 
 
This paper summarises the results of an extensive empirical investigation into the 
extent of meritocracy in the British education system and labour market. A 
meritocratic society could be defined as one in which an individual’s economic 
success and social status are determined by their own ability and effort, rather than by 
their parents’ socio-economic status. Specifically therefore, the paper investigates the 
relationship between social class, ability, educational achievement and subsequent 
labour market success.  
 
The motivation for the paper is the notion that we, as individuals and policy-makers, 
are striving to create a more meritocratic society based on the principle of equality of 
opportunity and the fulfilment of each individual’s potential. Many of the economic 
reforms of recent decades, designed to liberalise markets and increase 
competitiveness, have been motivated by a desire to move not only towards a more 
productive society but also towards a more meritocratic society, in which individuals 
succeed by their own ability and efforts. Improved access to education, regardless of 
social background, is a key policy lever that has been used in the attempt to bring 
about this more meritocratic society. One would have expected therefore that parental 
wealth and social class would have, overtime, become an increasingly poor predictor 
of how well you will do both in the education system and in the labour market.  
 
The central questions that the paper seeks to answer are therefore: 
 
a) Is it the case that the most able do best in terms of educational attainment? 
b) How important is social class in determining how well a person does in 
school? 
c) To what extent do the most able individuals do better in the labour market, for 
a given level of education and how has this changed over time?  
d) Does education facilitate social mobility or actually act as a barrier to 
mobility?  
e) What impact has educational expansion had on the relationship between social 
class, ability and labour market success?  
 
The paper uses two unique panel data sets, namely the National Child Development 
Study (a cohort born in 1958) and the British Cohort Study (a cohort born in 1970), to 
look at changes in our education system and labour market over time. The richness of 
the data enables an in-depth investigation of the complex and dynamic inter-
relationship between social class, ability, education and labour market outcomes. The 
data are superior to those used by many other researchers in this field. In particular, it 
comes from cohorts of individuals who have been followed since birth, and hence 
provides the extremely early measures of ability and cognitive skill that are crucial for 
this study.  
 
The results are dramatic and surprising. The effect of cognitive ability on educational 
attainment has actually decreased, while the role of parental social class and income 
in determining educational attainment has increased. In other words the British 
education system has become less meritocratic. A person’s ability is a poorer 
predictor of how well they do in educational terms now (or at least when the 1970 
cohort attended school in the 1970s and 1980s) than in the past. Likewise, the social 
class of a person’s parents actually has a greater impact on their educational 
attainment now than previously. This is all the more surprising given the attempts in 
the ‘60s and ‘70s (and indeed ever since) to expand and broaden access to education. 
What is most striking is that the probability of gaining a higher- level qualification, 
such as a degree, has increased similarly for all ability groups. Thus high ability poor 
boys and low ability rich boys have increased their participation in HE by a similar 
proportion. Thus it is not the most able who have benefited from the expansion of the 
UK education system but rather the most privileged.  
 
The paper also asks whether the value of cognitive ability in the labour market has 
changed in recent decades, focusing on the impact of ability on unemployment, 
participation and wages. Although the results are tempered by the fact that the study 
could only consider changes across two cohorts, the results suggest that the impact of 
cognitive ability on labour market participation and earnings has grown marginally. In 
particular, the growing importance of cognitive ability on female participation in the 
labour market is the most noticeable trend.  Simultaneously, the authors find a 
significant increase in the returns to higher education amongst individuals with mid-
range ability levels. Further investigation reveals that it is children from better off 
backgrounds who have mainly benefited from the increasing value of a degree.  
 
Of course if cognitive ability plays a key, and perhaps increasing role, in determining 
an individual’s success in the labour market, it is important to investigate the factors 
that determine this cognitive ability. Once again the results challenge a vision of a 
society with increasing equality of opportunity for all social classes. Parental income 
and social class have become increasingly important determinants of cognitive 
development, at least through primary school. The story emerging from the research is 
therefore that Britain actually became less meritocratic during the period covered by 
the two cohorts of data, namely the 1960s/70s to the 1980s/90s.  
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1 Introduction
A meritocratic society could be deﬁned as one in which an individual’s economic success
and social status are determined by their own ability and eﬀort, rather than by their par-
ents’ socio-economic status.1 Indeed the notion of meritocracy is closely allied to the idea
of equality of opportunity, which is championed by those from across the full range of the
political spectrum (Arrow et al (2000)). Of course, a meritocratic society is not necessarily
an equal society, since meritocracy is about equality of opportunity rather than equality
of outcomes. Indeed a relatively unequal society (such as has emerged in the US and
Britain in the last thirty years) is completely compatible with a wholly meritocratic one,
if a high price is paid for ability, and if ability is very unequally distributed. Nonetheless
the concept of meritocracy is generally used in a normative way, as an ideal to aspire to.2
Indeed many of the economic reforms of recent decades, designed to liberalise markets
and increase competitiveness, have been motivated by a desire to move towards a more
productive and meritocratic society in which individuals succeed by their own ability and
eﬀorts.
Yet the political consensus in favour of a meritocratic society, with equality of oppor-
tunity for all, has been recently undermined, at least in the US. This is because of the
growing belief that the poor, far from being the victims of discrimination and an unfair
economic system, actually lack productive ability (Arrow et al (2000)). Crudely put, the
argument is that the poor are unable to contribute to our society in an economic sense
because they lack the ability to do so and therefore policies to improve equality of oppor-
tunity, that do not also boost the productive ability of the poor, are doomed to failure.
This is essentially an empirical question about the changing relationship between abil-
ity and various socio-economic outcomes, especially education and earnings (Cawley et al
(1996)). Until recently the literature has focused on whether changes in the importance
of ability underlie observed patterns of wage diﬀerentials, as well as changes in the re-
turns to commonly observed characteristics, such as education (Blackburn and Neumark
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(1993); Murnane, Willet and Levy (1995); Grogger and Eide (1995); Hauser and Huang
(1997); Cawley et al (1998a) Heckman and Vytlacil (2001)). Yet the determinants of
cognitive ability, its relationship with educational attainment and its independent role in
the labour market are still not well understood. For example, an individual’s ‘ability’ is
itself not completely free from potentially unmeritocratic inﬂuences. The cognitive ability
and socio-economic status of a person’s parents to some extent predicts an individual’s
own socio-economic status due to both genetic heritage and potentially unmeritocratic
environmental factors.3 Unpacking the determinants of cognitive ability, and its relation-
ship with subsequent educational achievement and socio-economic success is therefore of
crucial policy importance.
This paper uses British data to examine the determinants of cognitive ability, its role
in the labour market, and how this has changed over time.4 There are features of British
society and its labour market that make our results of great interest to a broad reader-
ship, especially those interested in the US economy. Firstly, relative social mobility has
historically been very similar in the US and the UK (Erickson and Goldthorpe (1985)).
The caricature of Britain as a rigid, class-ridden society, compared to the more open and
ﬂuid US, is simply ﬂawed. Furthermore, like the US, the UK has experienced substantial
skill biased technological change in recent decades (Machin (1996,2001) and Machin and
Van Reenen (1998)). Although the British education system has been expanded so that
45% of each cohort now enters university (exactly the same proportion as enters higher
education in the United States (OECD 2001)), this expansion appears to have been in-
suﬃcient to meet the increased demand for skill. A similar situation has occurred in the
United States. This has lead to both higher returns to education and an increase in income
inequality (Harkness and Machin (1999); Walker and Zhu (2001)). In addition the UK
has experienced much economic reform during the last few decades. Labour and prod-
uct markets have been de-regulated, privatisation has been extensive, the power of the
unions has receded and, as said before, the education system expanded. Whether these
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extensive reforms have led to a more meritocratic society is obviously of great relevance
to academics and policy-makers in a number of other developed economies experiencing
similar economic change.
Our paper assesses whether meritocracy has increased between two cohorts that have
been exposed to very diﬀerent policy environments. The richness of our data, and the fact
that it is panel data from two cohorts, enables us to look at the complex and dynamic
inter-relationship between social class, ability, education and labour market outcomes. We
make a unique contribution to the literature in a number of ways. Firstly, we are able to
give a fuller picture of meritocracy in UK society, by assessing changes in the meritocratic
nature of the British education system, as well as changes in the labour market. Secondly,
our data is superior in a number of other respects. We have relatively early measures of
ability and cognitive skill and are therefore able to examine how such measures change
throughout childhood. This contrasts with much of the literature that has relied on US
data from the NLSY5, which only contains cognitive skill measures obtained from tests
taken in high school or even later. We also make use of early measures of non-cognitive
skill, which have been shown to be important (Heckman and Rubinstein (2001), Bowles et
al (2001a, 2001b)). Lastly we address some, though not all, of the methodological problems
identiﬁed by Heckman and Vytlacil (2001)). In particular, Heckman and Vytlacil (2001)
show that many ability measures, particularly those derived from the NLSY, are so strongly
correlated with educational attainment that large numbers of education/ability cells are
in fact empty. Our measures of cognitive ability come very early in childhood and can
be considered more as determinants of ﬁnal educational attainment rather than jointly
determined outcomes.6
The paper is set out as follows. The next section describes our data, its advantages and
the cognitive ability measures we construct. Then, in section three, we ask the question: to
what extent does cognitive ability determine an individual’s education level? We know that
education is an important determinant of labour market success but does the education
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system provide a means of increasing social mobility or is it in fact a barrier to mobility? To
pre-empt our results, we ﬁnd that the eﬀect of cognitive ability on educational attainment
has actually decreased, while the role of parental social class and income in determining
educational attainment has increased. In other words the education system has become
less meritocratic. In section four, we ask whether the value of cognitive ability in the labour
market has changed in recent decades, focusing on the impact of ability on unemployment,
participation and wages. Having shown that, under certain assumptions, cognitive ability
is becoming marginally more important in determining labour market success in terms of
employment outcomes and earnings, we ask whether this will lead to a more meritocratic
society.7 Thus in the ﬁnal section we return to the question of the determinants of cognitive
ability, and in particular the role of social class, family income, early education and other
parental inputs. We also consider the issue of inter-generational transmission of ability
and socio-economic status. We show that parental income and social class have become
increasingly important determinants of ﬁnal cognitive development. Furthermore, the
correlation between parent and child ability is considerable. We ﬁnd evidence that these
inter-generational correlations are very much mediated through socio-economic factors. In
summary, our research suggests that Britain has not become a more meritocratic society,
despite policy interventions designed speciﬁcally to bring this about.
2 Data
Our data combines highly comparable longitudinal information from two British cohorts,
namely, the National Child Development Study of 1958 (NCDS) and the British Cohort
Study of 1970 (BCS). The former follows the cohort born in Britain in the week 3-9 of
March 1958, with follow ups on the children and their families and school environments at
the ages of 7, 11 and 16. Further follow up studies were undertaken in 1981 (age 23), 1991
(age 33) and 2000 (age 42). BCS is a longitudinal study of British children born between
5 and 11 April 1970, with follow ups at ages 5, 10, 16, 21, 26 and 30. Therefore the two
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studies are not identical, since respondents were not interviewed at exactly the same ages.
Nonetheless, the questions asked of the two sets of respondents were very similar, enabling
cohort comparisons to be made.
An advantage of our data is that we have full information on initial social class, early
parental inputs, early cognitive ability, schooling, educational attainment and subsequent
measures of socio-economic success. Many other papers in this ﬁeld have had to rely
on contemporaneous information on parental social class and respondents’ educational
attainment. This latter approach necessarily regards educational achievement as deter-
mined purely by individual eﬀorts and potential ‘ability’, and not as a product itself of
unmeritocratic inﬂuences.8 In this paper we are able to look at the determinants of both
educational attainment and indeed cognitive ability.9
We follow the recent literature in this ﬁeld, combining individual cognitive ability
test scores and investigating the eﬀect of these test scores on subsequent socioeconomic
outcomes.10 Unlike most of the literature however, we have early measures of cognitive
ability from tests preceding entry into secondary schooling. The problem with any type
of ability test is that it will provide only an approximate measure of an individual’s gen-
uine potential ability. We argue however that measures obtained in earlier stages of an
individual’s childhood may prove less sensitive to environmental inﬂuences.11
The key ability measure in this paper follows partially the methodology used in Cawley
et al (1996,1998a,1998b,2001). Test scores obtained at the age of 11 in the NCDS and at
the age of 10 for BCS12 constitute the basis for the analysis because of the proximity in
terms of age across cohorts, the similar type of scores derived13 and the fact that this age
provides a reasonable compromise between the objective of obtaining reliable and stable
measures of cognitive ability and that of removing as many educational inputs as possible.
As has been said, in contrast to the ability measures in the NLSY used by Cawley and
others, our ability measures precede individuals’ eventual educational achievement level.
The other advantage of using the age 10/11 test scores is that the tests were administered
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at an almost identical age for both cohorts, and thus the potential for parental and other
environmental inﬂuences to aﬀect measured scores is similar.14 Test age is a particularly
important issue and a draw back of the NLSY data used most often in this ﬁeld is that older
cohorts were tested at a later age. Because some smart younger children will be subject to
worse environmental inﬂuences, measurements of their cognitive attainment at a later age
would provide lower ﬁgures than suggested by early measurement. Thereby, conditioning
on this score would often lead to misleading comparisons, even after residualizing scores
on youth’s age.
Our data is not exempt from problems either. Because the tests administered for the
two cohorts were not exactly identical, it is not possible to use a raw test score in the
analysis. Using dummies for quintiles of the distribution of scores has been the standard
approach so far, but the relatively high correlation between the diﬀerent test scores often
leads to multi-collinearity problems and other missing data issues when trying to interact
them with other variables of interest.15 We attempt to circumvent these problems by
calculating the ﬁrst principal component for each cohort from the set of available tests.
Statistically, the ﬁrst principal component is a linear combination of the original test
scores with the property of maximising the total explained variance. In the psychometric
literature, this measure has been frequently associated with the construct “g”, described as
the underlying general ability or intelligence factor. In a series of papers using the NLSY
data, Cawley et al (1996,1998a,1998b,2001) ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on “g” in the log wage
regression is positive and statistically signiﬁcant in all cases, although it is rarely the case
this is the only signiﬁcant component from the possible ten orthogonal components that
can be derived from the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB).
The arguments about the best way to measure general intelligence continue. We take
a pragmatic view. The main reason for using a construct of “g” is to enable the conversion
of a set of ability variables into a single, continuous, cross-cohort comparable variable. Our
interpretation of this variable is that of an index that allows us to rank each individual,
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within her own cohort, in terms of cognitive ability.16
Information about the process of extracting g in each cohort from the set of available
ability scores is provided in table 1. The ﬁrst two columns indicate the principal component
order and the cumulative proportion of the overall score variation explained by principal
components. Columns 3 and 4 specify the correlation between each test score and the ﬁrst
principal component, which can be considered as an indicator of the contribution of each
score to the construct g.
Table 1: Cognitive ability indexes at age 11/10
Pcpal comp. Cumul.var.expl. Original test scores Corr:(Score, g)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NCDS (1958 cohort)-Age 11
g(5)=1 0.69 Copying designs 0.26
2 0.85 Verbal ability 0.50
3 0.92 Non verbal ability 0.48
4 0.96 Maths 0.49
5 1.00 Reading 0.46
g(4): Four scores only. Correlation (g(5),g(4))=0.9951
g(4)= 1 0.81 Verbal ability 0.51
2 0.90 Non verbal ability 0.49
3 0.96 Maths 0.50
4 1.00 Reading 0.48
g(3): Three scores only. Correlation (g(5),g(3))=0.9862
g(3)= 1 0.84 Ver+non ver.ab. 0.58
2 0.93 Maths 0.58
3 1.00 Reading 0.56
BCS (1970 cohort) -Age 10
1 0.82 Friendly Maths Test 0.57
2 0.91 Edinburgh Reading Test 0.58
3 1.00 British Ability Scales 0.58
NOTE: Col.(1) indicates the order of extraction of principal components (p.c.) under
diﬀerent speciﬁcations, with values in col.(2) representing the cumulative proportion
of variance of scores explained by principal components. Col.(3) labels in each section
denote the scores used to derive each set of p.c., accompanied in col. (4) by correlation
of each test score with the ﬁrst p.c. in each case. NCDS-age 11 p.c. derived under
three alternative sets of test scores: i)All ﬁve. ii)As i), excluding copying designs.
iii)As ii), aggregating verbal and non verbal a single score through addition.
Because there are more tests available in NCDS (5) than in BCS (3), we observe that
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the ﬁrst principal component in the former case explains a lower proportion of the total
variation. Substantial diﬀerences in the variation of g across cohorts can also be due to
test diﬀerences such as the absence of a copying designs test in BCS.17 In order to explore
these possibilities, we have calculated g for the NCDS cohort in three diﬀerent possible
ways: including all scores, excluding copying designs and aggregating verbal and non-
verbal ability into one score. Table 1 also displays the correlations between alternative
speciﬁcations, which suggest a considerable degree of robustness (98/99 % correlation).
Additional robustness checks are needed to support the comparative cohort analysis
using the g index. Comparing NCDS results (with three scores) and BCS, one can see that
the proportion of variance explained by the ﬁrst component is highly similar (84% vs 82%,
respectively) and the correlations with general ability, maths and reading are also very
similar across cohorts.18 Finally, we also compare the distributions of the ability indices,
as displayed in ﬁgure 1. This conﬁrms the high correlation between diﬀerent constructs
of g for NCDS. It also reveals a very close similarity between the distribution of g for
NCDS and BCS. All this evidence leads us to accept measured g as a comparable index
of individual’s ranking, in terms of cognitive ability, within their own cohort.
In addition to this cognitive ability index, an indicator of behavioural adjustment
at age 10/11 is used as a proxy for certain non-cognitive abilities. This indicator is
derived from the Bristol Social Adjustment Guide (BSAG), which measures the child’s
capacity to adjust to diﬀerent social environments and circumstances, as well as providing
an indication of his or her hostility or depression. This antisocial index is constructed
by adding up the number of items and then standardising the total score. Higher values
represent lower adaptability. The importance of this type of measure of non-cognitive skill
has been emphasized by Heckman and Rubinstein (2001), Cawley et al (2001), Osborne
(2000) and Bowles et al (2001a).
Additional controls used in this paper include: Father’s social class at birth and at age
11/10, measures of family income at age 16, parental education and age when child was
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Figure 1: Ability indexes at age 11/10
Ability index: g
 Density of g: 1970 cohort  Density of g: 1958 cohort, all 
 Density of g: 1958 cohort, 4 te  Density of g: 1958 cohort, 3 te
−3.38325 2.65544
0
.36317
NOTE: Kernel density estimates of cognitive ability index distribution for BCS and
NCDS (under three alternative speciﬁcations speciﬁed in table 1).
born and number of children in household at age 11/10. We noted earlier that parental
social class may inﬂuence the child’s outcomes in a manner that is not necessarily unmer-
itocratic. In particular, higher SES families may invest more in their children in terms
of parental time, interest and taste for education. We therefore control for this as best
we can by including indicators of what teachers think about both father’s and mother’s
interest in their child’s education at age 10/11, which have been shown to be important
determinants of educational attainment (Feinstein and Symons (1999)).
3 Education opportunities and attainment
Most assessments of the changing meritocratic nature of our society focus on whether
an individual’s ability and eﬀort play a more important role in determining their socio-
economic success. Ability and eﬀort are measured in numerous ways, with educational
9
attainment often included as an indicator of both ability and eﬀort. The assumption
is that education is an essentially meritocratic determinant of socio-economic outcomes.
However, if in fact social class diﬀerences are cemented or magniﬁed by the education sys-
tem, this assumption is fundamentally ﬂawed. Thus to give a fuller picture of meritocracy
in Britain, we ﬁrst investigate the relationship between ability, social class and educational
attainment.
To examine whether the educational system has become more meritocratic, i.e. whether
cognitive ability has a greater role in determining educational outcomes than was the case
in the past, we estimate an ordered probit model where the dependent variable is the
highest achieved academic qualiﬁcation level. There are ﬁve educational attainment cat-
egories: (i) No qualiﬁcations, (ii) Certiﬁcates of Secondary Education (CSEs, grades 2 to
5) or less than 5 Ordinary levels (O levels)19, (iii) More than 5 O-levels20, (iv) Advanced
levels (A levels)21, (v) Degree or higher.22 This statistical model assumes that there is
an underlying index describing an individual’s propensity to invest in education, which
depends linearly on a series of factors, including measures of ability and other family and
parental socio-economic characteristics. Full estimates are displayed in table 2. Summa-
rized information about the marginal eﬀects of key selected variables on the probability
of reaching a given qualiﬁcation level are provided in table 3.
For each cohort, and for both men and women, cognitive and non-cognitive ability are
important determinants of educational attainment. The results also suggest that in the
later cohort there has been a reduction in the marginal eﬀect of cognitive ability on the
probability of obtaining A-levels, although there has been no change regarding the eﬀect
of cognitive ability on the probability of becoming a college graduate. Simultaneously, for
the later cohort there has been an increase (particularly for men) in the marginal eﬀect
of parental income (measured at 16) on the probability of obtaining a higher education
qualiﬁcation. Broadly speaking, we are looking at a process of investment in education
that takes place between age 10 and 22. For the NCDS cohort this covers the period from
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Table 2: Determinants of educational attainment: Ordered probit estimates
Men Women
Variable NCDS BCS NCDS BCS
Coef. R.S.E. Coef. R.S.E. Coef. R.S.E. Coef. R.S.E.
Cognitive ability index 0.731 0.033 0.582 0.040 0.765 0.035 0.609 0.041
Antisocial index -0.085 0.025 -0.037 0.032 -0.084 0.032 -0.071 0.038
Log family income at 16 0.029 0.047 0.178 0.061 0.166 0.050 0.203 0.061
Father’s SES at 11/10
Professional 0.398 0.156 0.335 0.234 0.362 0.178 0.618 0.225
Intermediate 0.281 0.135 0.297 0.194 0.255 0.136 0.509 0.166
Skilled non-man 0.195 0.136 0.422 0.204 0.164 0.139 0.411 0.171
Skilled manual 0.149 0.116 0.089 0.180 0.207 0.122 0.258 0.146
Semi-skilled 0.103 0.123 0.217 0.194 0.048 0.126 0.235 0.158
Father’s SES at birth
Professional 0.508 0.161 0.591 0.241 0.228 0.166 0.384 0.216
Intermediate 0.226 0.117 0.268 0.181 0.035 0.119 0.264 0.155
Skilled non-man 0.115 0.117 0.155 0.171 0.069 0.116 0.079 0.148
Skilled manual 0.061 0.090 0.140 0.150 0.051 0.090 0.215 0.124
Semi-skilled -0.019 0.104 0.063 0.163 -0.045 0.102 0.299 0.138
Parental education
Father middle 0.212 0.072 -0.006 0.106 0.056 0.072 -0.086 0.098
Father high 0.290 0.100 0.211 0.135 0.180 0.104 -0.041 0.126
Mother middle 0.141 0.065 0.207 0.096 0.201 0.063 0.323 0.092
Mother high 0.101 0.112 0.239 0.151 0.592 0.122 0.578 0.144
Father’s age at birth -0.006 0.006 0.002 0.008 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.008
Mother’s age at birth 0.010 0.007 0.000 0.009 0.003 0.007 0.003 0.009
Father’s interest in ed.
Middle 0.277 0.087 0.048 0.174 0.201 0.095 -0.227 0.209
High 0.393 0.100 0.172 0.184 0.308 0.111 -0.048 0.209
Teacher can’t say 0.312 0.090 0.123 0.172 0.255 0.099 -0.130 0.200
Mother’s interest in ed.
Middle 0.046 0.094 0.065 0.188 0.028 0.104 0.431 0.195
High 0.060 0.103 0.167 0.197 0.140 0.118 0.555 0.199
Teacher can’t say -0.151 0.116 0.157 0.206 -0.062 0.127 0.380 0.202
Cutpoints (ancillary parameters)
No quals to CSE,O-lev(-) -0.359 0.254 0.477 0.405 0.044 0.272 0.612 0.388
CSE,O-lev(-) to O-lev(+) 0.377 0.255 0.902 0.406 0.711 0.272 1.156 0.387
O-lev(+) to A-level 1.708 0.259 2.169 0.408 2.158 0.276 2.596 0.389
A-level to Higher Ed. 2.065 0.261 2.403 0.409 2.632 0.279 2.912 0.390
Observations 2561 1467 2601 1620
Pseudo R2 0.1906 0.1519 0.1852 0.1572
Log-likelihood -3136.79 -1769.37 -3174.91 -1910.09
NOTE: Full set of coeﬃcients from ordered probit estimates of highest educational
attainment. Robust standard errors displayed within parentheses. Selected marginal
eﬀects displayed below.
1968 to 1980 whereas the equivalent period in the BCS cohort is 1980 to 1992. These
results do not suggest that the UK education system has become more meritocratic from
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Table 3: Marginal eﬀects of cognitive ability and log-income
Men Women
Education group Variable NCDS BCS NCDS BCS
CSEs/O-levels(-) Ability -0.053 -0.033 -0.058 -0.046
Log-income -0.002 -0.010 -0.012 -0.015
O-levels(+) Ability 0.009 -0.029 -0.002 -0.053
Log-income 0.000 -0.009 -0.001 -0.017
A-levels Ability 0.025 0.011 0.039 0.014
Log-income 0.001 0.003 0.008 0.004
Higher education Ability 0.153 0.159 0.164 0.166
Log-income 0.006 0.049 0.033 0.055
NOTE: Based on ordered probit estimates of the probability of achieving a given level
of educational attainment, derived from table 2. No qualiﬁcations category excluded
from table (marginal eﬀects add up to nil).
the seventies to the eighties.23
Although our evidence suggests family income is an important determinant of educa-
tional attainment, this might be simply because parents who are more interested in their
child’s education, and whose children consequently do better at school, also happen to be
wealthier. We therefore follow Feinstein and Symons (1999) and control for the level of
parental interest in the child’s education. These variables are important. Furthermore,
these parental interest variables are not responsible for the observed changes between the
cohorts in the eﬀects of income or other family characteristics on educational attainment.24
The signiﬁcance of family income as an important determinant of educational attainment
is also supported by new quasi-experimental evidence, also from the UK, on a recently
piloted government initiative that pays children or families an allowance if they stay on in
school after the compulsory school leaving age.25
We have also investigated the existence of cognitive ability and family income interac-
tions in the determination of an individual’s propensity to obtain more education. Table
4 provides evidence on this. For the 1958 cohort, the eﬀect of ability was almost inde-
pendent of income. For the 1970 cohort the positive eﬀect of ability on attainment is
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only noticeable for those with higher family incomes. Moreover, the independent eﬀect
of income also appears to be higher than for the older cohort. Thus for the later cohort,
cognitive ability only leads to higher chances of success in education for higher levels of
family income.
Table 4: Ability-income interactions in educational attainment:
Ordered probit coeﬃcients
Men Women
NCDS BCS NCDS BCS
Cognitive ability index 11/10 0.55 -0.53 0.60 -0.09
(0.17) (0.26) (0.20) (0.25)
Log parental income at 16 0.12 0.27 0.24 0.34
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Ability index*log income 0.06 0.22 0.04 0.14
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
NOTE: Based on ordered probit estimates of the probability of achieving a given
level of educational attainment. Other controls include measures of parental and
maternal interest in child’s education from teacher’s reports and number of children
in household at 11/10.
Further investigation of family income, social class and cognitive ability interactions
conﬁrmed that the expansion of the British education system appears to have dispropor-
tionately beneﬁted children from wealthier backgrounds and higher social classes.26 For
example, we found that for girls in the highest ability quartile, the probability of get-
ting a degree if they come from a family in the bottom income quintile goes down from
38% to 29% between the cohorts. For a girl whose family is in the top income quintile,
this probability increased from 60% to 77%. For boys, the participation gap by income
group becomes larger between the two cohorts, and these results also hold true if we sep-
arate children from diﬀerent social classes. For example, consider again the top ability
quartile: sons of professionals increased their probability of getting a degree from 76% to
85% whereas sons of unskilled workers had a reduced probability of becoming a college
graduate, from 40% to 19%.
All this evidence paints a convincing picture of an increasingly unmeritocratic edu-
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cation system, despite being a period of rapid expansion in the UK education system.
Thus, although the probability of a randomly selected child achieving a higher level of
qualiﬁcation increased over the period, this expansion has not improved the educational
opportunities for all income groups and social classes equally. Nor has this expansion been
largely about more able children gaining better educational opportunities. Instead, it is
the children from the wealthiest backgrounds that have beneﬁted most.
4 Labor market outcomes
In this section we assess the extent of meritocracy, as we have deﬁned and measured it, in
the UK labour market. Clearly labour market success is not the only outcome of potential
interest. There are many other ways in which a society might reward cognitive ability that,
although not related to labor market success, may have an economic value in themselves.27
Our focus though is on standard measures of economic success which are undoubtedly
related to an individual’s economic well being. Speciﬁcally we provide evidence on the
eﬀects of cognitive ability on labour market participation and hourly earnings.28 Since we
have already shown that cognitive ability partly determines educational attainment, we
also explore the inter-relationship between cognitive ability, education and eventual labour
market success.
4.1 Participation eﬀects of ability
In this section we assess whether cognitive ability is a strong predictor of an individual’s
economic activity status and whether signiﬁcant changes have occurred between the two
cohorts. In a more meritocratic society, cognitive ability should be a more important deter-
minant of whether an individual is unemployed, as opposed to other characteristics, social
background or just luck. To compare patterns across cohorts, we use the retrospective in-
formation contained in the NCDS33 and BCS30 to obtain information on the respondents’
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economic activity at an identical age. We chose to compare individuals shortly before their
twenty-ninth birthday, in the month of January. The intention here is to minimise the
problem of recall bias, as it is most recent available common date for members of both
cohorts. We also aim to overcome the problem of diﬀerential seasonal eﬀects by choosing
the same month in the two years.29
Table 5 shows the male marginal eﬀects from a probit estimation where the dependent
variable takes a value of one if the person is unemployed, zero otherwise. We estimate
the model with and without our cognitive and non-cognitive ability measures, namely
g and the index of anti-social behaviour respectively. Speciﬁcations without these two
variables suggest that academic and vocational qualiﬁcations play an important ‘protec-
tive’ role against unemployment. Mother’s education and parental social class also appear
to be important protective factors. When we include our two ability measures however,
the predictive power of the qualiﬁcations variables falls substantially for both cohorts.
Only intermediate vocational qualiﬁcations retain some part of their initial explanatory
power. Thus, it is ability, both cognitive and non-cognitive, that is the more powerful
determinant of whether a person is unemployed at a given time. Estimates suggest there
are no signiﬁcant cohort changes in the eﬀect of cognitive ability on the probability of
unemployment.
For females, non-participation, rather than just unemployment, is important in our
samples. Female participation in the UK has increased substantially in recent decades.
Table 6 shows the results from a probit model where the dependent variable takes the
value of one if the woman is not employed, zero otherwise. As for the male unemployment
estimates, educational qualiﬁcations are important protective factors, guarding against
non-employment.30 However, unlike for the male model, the estimates on the qualiﬁcation
variables are robust to the inclusion of our cognitive and non-cognitive ability variables.
With and without these ability controls, the positive eﬀect from qualiﬁcations has increased
in the later cohort, i.e those born in 1970. Thus, higher female participation has not been
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Table 5: Determinants of unemployment among men: Probit
estimates
NCDS-Men (29) BCS-Men (29)
Basic Extended Basic Extended
Coef. R.S.E. Coef. R.S.E. Coef. R.S.E. Coef. R.S.E.
Aca.NVQ1 -0.251 0.110 -0.149 0.113 -0.055 0.134 0.018 0.137
[-0.015] [-0.008] [-0.003] [0.001]
Aca.NVQ2 -0.388 0.098 -0.128 0.109 -0.209 0.101 -0.045 0.111
[-0.024] [-0.008] [-0.012] [-0.002]
Aca.NVQ3 -0.435 0.165 -0.047 0.180 -0.544 0.221 -0.270 0.236
[-0.021] [-0.003] [-0.022] [-0.012]
Aca.NVQ4 -0.576 0.142 -0.162 0.158 -0.484 0.132 -0.201 0.150
[-0.028] [-0.009] [-0.024] [-0.010]
Aca.NVQ5 -0.442 0.252 0.039 0.267 -0.478 0.265 -0.061 0.283
[-0.020] [0.002] [-0.019] [-0.003]
Voc.NVQ1 -0.112 0.115 -0.086 0.119 -0.038 0.116 -0.028 0.118
[-0.007] [-0.005] [-0.019] [-0.001]
Voc.NVQ2 -0.063 0.104 -0.032 0.106 -0.369 0.126 -0.408 0.126
[-0.004] [-0.002] [-0.019] [-0.018]
Voc.NVQ3 -0.163 0.118 -0.078 0.121 -0.276 0.126 -0.228 0.128
[-0.010] [-0.004] [-0.014] [-0.011]
Voc.NVQ4 -0.234 0.118 -0.172 0.122 -0.164 0.133 -0.129 0.136
[-0.014] [-0.010] [-0.009] [-0.007]
Cogn.ability -0.190 0.051 -0.240 0.053
[-0.012] [-0.013]
Antisoc.index 0.154 0.034 0.084 0.039
[0.009] [ 0.005]
Intercept -1.054 0.098 -1.408 0.110 -1.134 0.125 -1.393 0.145
Proport.unemp 0.039 0.039 0.034 0.034
Observations 4178 4178 3639 3639
Log-likelihood -644.3 -622.4 -508.5 -491.8
Pseudo-R2 0.069 0.100 0.060 0.091
NOTE: Dependent variable=1 if unemployed, 0 otherwise. Sample: Active men.
Other controls: Father’s social class and parental education. Marginal eﬀects within
square brackets. Educational dummies refer to highest level of both academic and
vocational qualiﬁcation attainment.
uniformly distributed across the whole educational attainment spectrum. The role of
cognitive ability also appears to have become stronger and this change is statistically
signiﬁcant. No strong evidence for any change in the eﬀect of our non-cognitive ability
measure was found.
We have also analyzed the phenomenon of increased female participation by looking
into the determinants of the type of participation in the workforce.31 More educated
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women who do participate are less likely to occupy part-time jobs. Women with higher
qualiﬁcations also tend to be more likely to work full-time, and this phenomenon is also
quite robust to controlling for measures of ability. Indeed, ability appears to have become
a more important positive determinant of full time participation for women.
Table 6: Determinants of economic inactivity among women:
Probit estimates
NCDS-Women (29) BCS-Women (29)
Basic Extended Basic Extended
Coef. R.S.E. Coef. R.S.E. Coef. R.S.E. Coef. R.S.E.
Aca.NVQ1 -0.193 0.071 -0.142 0.072 -0.331 0.086 -0.298 0.086
[-0.069] [-0.051] [-0.089] [-0.081]
Aca.NVQ2 -0.387 0.061 -0.278 0.067 -0.382 0.065 -0.275 0.068
[-0.141] [-0.102] [ -0.113] [-0.082]
Aca.NVQ3 -0.412 0.085 -0.254 0.094 -0.661 0.100 -0.482 0.105
[-0.141] [ -0.090] [-0.157] [ -0.122]
Aca.NVQ4 -0.683 0.077 -0.512 0.088 -0.679 0.080 -0.506 0.086
[-0.225] [-0.175] [-0.179] [-0.138]
Aca.NVQ5 -0.802 0.163 -0.618 0.171 -0.956 0.169 -0.707 0.175
[-0.237] [-0.195] [-0.191] [-0.159]
Voc.NVQ1 -0.110 0.058 -0.097 0.058 -0.289 0.062 -0.272 0.063
[-0.040] [-0.035] [ -0.082] [-0.077]
Voc.NVQ2 -0.083 0.063 -0.076 0.064 -0.164 0.062 -0.168 0.063
[-0.030] [-0.027] [ -0.046] [-0.047]
Voc.NVQ3 -0.035 0.071 -0.015 0.071 -0.462 0.080 -0.460 0.080
[-0.012] [-0.005] [ -0.119] [-0.118]
Voc.NVQ4 -0.258 0.063 -0.251 0.063 -0.391 0.076 -0.374 0.077
[-0.092] [-0.089] [-0.104] [-0.100]
Voc.NVQ5 0.556 0.172 0.570 0.173 -0.407 0.171 -0.340 0.172
[0.217] [0.223] [-0.103] [-0.088]
Cogn.ability -0.088 0.029 -0.158 0.028
[ -0.032] [-0.047]
Antisoc.index 0.051 0.025 0.042 0.025
[0.018] [0.012]
Intercept 0.108 0.063 -0.001 0.069 0.166 0.076 0.019 0.080
Inactivity rate 0.359 0.359 0.245 0.245
Observations 4335 4335 4139 4139
Log-likelihood -2724.9 -2716.5 -2151.0 -2132.4
Pseudo-R2 0.038 0.041 0.068 0.076
NOTE: Probit estimates. Baseline category: No qualiﬁcations, unskilled manual
father and parents without any qualiﬁcation. Estimated coeﬃcients and robust stan-
dard errors reported. Marginal eﬀects within square brackets. Other controls included
are father’s SES at birth and parental education measures.
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4.2 Ability and earnings
This section investigates the following speciﬁc questions:
• Are measured wage returns to cognitive ability, i.e. g, identically distributed across
diﬀerent groups of workers?
• Are there any other abilities, aside from cognitive skills, that inﬂuence wages?
• Can this cohort data be used to identify changes in the returns to g over time,
separately from age eﬀects?
• Is it really possible to separately identify the eﬀect of education and cognitive ability?
• How does g contribute to the explanation of unobserved wage diﬀerences?
First, we looked at the eﬀects of cognitive ability on earnings by gender. Cognitive skills
appear to be priced diﬀerently for men and women, with women’s skills the more valuable.
The gender gap in returns to g is around 4% (0.039) in the NCDS33 and falls to just under
3% (0.027) in the BCS (age 30).32 This change parallels an observed reduction in level
earnings diﬀerences between men and women: from a 0.37 wage penalty for women in the
1958 cohort to a smaller yet still signiﬁcant value of 0.18 for the 1970 cohort. Qualitatively,
these gender diﬀerences in the estimated ‘returns’ to g coincide with the result in Cawley
et al (1996) and may reﬂect diﬀerent patterns of labour market participation based on
cognitive ability. Indeed, a one standard deviation increase in the cognitive ability index
implies an increase in the probability of participation by 5.3 percent for men compared
to 6.5 for women in the NCDS33, and an impact of 3.7 for men and 8.9 for women in
the BCS30. This implies that female participation is more related to cognitive ability and
might explain the subsequent observed gender diﬀerences in wage returns.33 Comparing
the two cohorts, the increased participation for women in the later cohort tends to reduce
the gender gap in both levels and returns to cognitive ability, although the latter eﬀect
is not statistically signiﬁcant. However, comparisons across the two cohorts for women
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are extremely problematic with changes in fertility patterns: the later cohort having fewer
children at an older age. Therefore as we don’t have reliable cross-cohort comparable
exclusion restrictions to control for participation, we restrict the rest of our analysis on
wages to men.
The male wage results are shown in table 7, which presents estimates of the eﬀect of
cognitive and non-cognitive ability on log hourly wages in each of the available surveys.
Two speciﬁcations are provided: the ﬁrst includes parental background information such
as social class and education level. The second speciﬁcation also includes the qualiﬁcation
level of the individual to control for highest educational attainment.
Table 7: Returns to ability: OLS estimates
Without qualiﬁcations With qualiﬁcations
Cognitive ability Non-cog.ability Cognitive ability Non-cog.ability
Survey Coeﬀ. R.S.E. Coeﬀ. R.S.E. Coeﬀ. R.S.E. Coeﬀ. R.S.E.
NCDS23 0.055 (0.010) -0.023 (0.007) 0.049 (0.011) -0.021 (0.007)
NCDS33 0.140 (0.009) -0.039 (0.008) 0.077 (0.010) -0.031 (0.008)
NCDS42 0.172 (0.010) -0.039 (0.009) 0.098 (0.012) -0.029 (0.009)
BCS21 0.065 (0.027) -0.033 (0.021) 0.044 (0.026) -0.030 (0.021)
BCS26 0.091 (0.011) -0.017 (0.010) 0.065 (0.013) -0.012 (0.010)
BCS30 0.130 (0.009) -0.016 (0.008) 0.085 (0.010) -0.009 (0.008)
NOTE: Dependent variable: Log-hourly wages. All regressions include parental edu-
cation and social class. Speciﬁcations with qualiﬁcations include both academic and
vocational highest qualiﬁcation dummies. Robust standard errors within parentheses.
Even though inclusion of the highest qualiﬁcation variables reduces the size of the
estimated returns to both types of ability, for both cohorts, both of our cognitive and non-
cognitive ability measures have a signiﬁcant impact on an individual’s economic success
as measured by hourly wages. In this case, early assessments of children’s capacity to
interact with other individuals (our non-cognitive ability measure) help to explain not
only their capacity to obtain higher qualiﬁcations, but also how the market will price their
labour. This highlights the social dimension of the general concept of skill. Economists
often wrongly see skill as a one-dimensional attribute, either measured by education level
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or cognitive ability test scores. However, this evidence conﬁrms for the UK that diﬀerent
aspects of skill are valued in the labour market, consistent with some US evidence (Bowles
et al (2001)).
It is important to note that the cohorts have been compared based on estimates
from diﬀerent years and the age diﬀerence between the cohorts is quite marked for any
NCDS/BCS pair of estimates (e.g. 3 years if we compare NCDS33 with BCS30). If, for
example, cognitive ability is partially unobservable by employers but they learn about it
over time, three years might involve a substantial diﬀerence in estimated returns. Al-
ternatively, if more educated and more able individuals learn faster while employed and
receive more training from their employers, one may expect a similar diﬀerence. With
these caveats in mind, we now show what these estimates imply for life-cycle and cohort
changes in the returns to ability.
A problem with cross-cohort comparisons, referred to in Heckman and Vytlacil (2001),
follows from the diﬃculty in separately identifying age and year eﬀects, given the lack of
data for many of the possible age-year combinations. In our case, this problem is stronger
because there are only three diﬀerent year observations for each cohort, and there are only
two cohorts.
We carry out a graphical interpolation exercise can be considered as a less restrictive
imposition on the data than an arbitrary functional form. Figure 2 displays the point
estimates of returns to g reported in table 7 on its left. The ﬁgure on the right hand side
documents the estimated returns to years of full time education after the age of compulsory
schooling.34
The severity of our missing data problem cannot be denied. There is no common age
support for age values higher than 30 and younger than 23. Having only two cohorts, time
eﬀects are restricted to twelve-year long intervals (the diﬀerence in birth dates for both
cohorts) that must refer to relatively young workers (ages 23 to 30). However, there are
important features that emerge from such limited data, such as a clear life-cycle pattern
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of increasing returns to ability (over the set of observed age values) which is common to
both cohorts.
Figure 2: Returns to cognitive ability and years of education over lifetime: By
cohort
Returns to cognitive ability
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 58: No quals.  70: No quals.
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NOTE: Returns to measure of cognitive ability displayed by cohort and two speciﬁcations:
(1) Including parental social class and education controls. (2) As in (1), including detailed
individual qualiﬁcations. Returns to years of post compulsory (after 16) full time education
displayed by cohort and two speciﬁcations. (1) With parental controls. (2) As in (1),
including measures of cognitive and non-cognitive ability. All returns are based on OLS
regressions of log hourly wages for working males in each survey.
The left part of ﬁgure 2 shows that the ﬁtted ability returns/age proﬁle for the later
1970 cohort always exceeds that for the 1958 NCDS cohort. We discuss the two speciﬁca-
tions separately. Firstly, without qualiﬁcation controls, the gap is marginally wider when
the cohorts are in their early twenties, which corresponds to a comparison of the early
1980s with the early 1990s. According to the literature, this is the period when returns
to education grew faster (Gosling et al (2000)). Thus, in order to make inferences about
changes in this period we must rely on two relatively young cohorts, when returns to both
education and ability are at their lowest. The gap in ability returns between the cohorts
actually becomes smaller as age grows and the time comparison must refer to the late
nineties versus the late eighties. This coincides with the deceleration in the upward trend
in returns to education which was reported during the nineties.
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After controlling for education, the gap in ability returns between the cohorts increases
monotonically and the returns can be well ﬁtted with a straight line. Cognitive ability is
increasingly rewarded in the labour market as an individual grows older, and this pattern
has become marginally stronger in the 1970 cohort.
For reference, we also display estimated returns to schooling by cohort under alternative
speciﬁcations. With and without ability measures, returns to schooling appear to increase
at least until the mid-thirties. For very young individuals, returns to education are not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero because more educated individuals have only just joined
the labour market and are compared to more experienced workers. Neglecting ability data
leads to higher estimates of the returns to education. No signiﬁcant diﬀerences can be
found between cohorts for either speciﬁcation (with and without ability controls).
As said, estimated changes in returns are speciﬁc for a particular age group, and
we cannot say anything about other age values and time periods of interest. Figure 2
suggests that it would be misleading to infer a decrease in the returns to education from a
crude comparison between NCDS at 33 and BCS at 30. However, since we observed non-
decreasing wage ability and education proﬁles over the observed lifetime, we can interpret
observed changes in the returns to ability and education between the two cohorts for such
ages as lower bound estimates for the actual changes.
Another important problem we face when making inferences about the role of ability
is the separate identiﬁcation of ability and schooling eﬀects (Cawley et al (1998a) and
Heckman and Vytlacil (2001)). Earlier results about the determinants of highest qualiﬁ-
cation attained (e.g. table 2) indicate the presence of a strong sorting problem between
ability and highest qualiﬁcation attained. This implies a serious problem in identifying
what the eﬀect of higher education might be for an individual at the bottom of the abil-
ity distribution. Our data has the logical advantage of providing an ability index that
precedes most educational investments and certainly ﬁnal educational outcomes in terms
of qualiﬁcations. The sorting problem in our data is therefore less pronounced but not
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completely absent, as we will now show.35
For each age-cohort group available, we have divided the sample into three grossly
deﬁned educational groups; ‘low’ (equivalent to high school dropout), ‘middle’ (equivalent
to high school graduate) and ‘high’ (higher education degree). This is intended to increase
cell sizes. For each one of these groups, we have estimated log hourly wage regressions
on the ability index g using a ﬂexible functional form speciﬁcation based on splines, with
knots at the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles in the ability distribution. This assumes that
the eﬀect of g on expected log wages, conditional on education, is linear within each ability
quartile and continuous across the whole ability distribution.36
In order to ease the interpretation of results, we use graphs to display our estimates. We
have plotted the predicted log hourly wages against our ability measure, g, with associated
conﬁdence intervals.37 This type of graphical illustration is useful for two reasons: ﬁrstly,
the sorting problem is easy to locate on the graph as sparsely populated areas indicate an
insuﬃcient number of observations to identify any relationship between ability, education
and earnings.38 Secondly, it is easy to identify the ability levels at which signiﬁcant
diﬀerences can be found between diﬀerent education groups, namely where the conﬁdence
intervals for the predicted log wages do not overlap.
Figure 3 illustrates the returns to g and qualiﬁcations that can be found in the data
for NCDS men at the age of thirty-three and BCS men at the age of 30. Certain patterns
are common to both cohorts. The education/ability sorting problem described above
is easily observed from the few observations corresponding to high qualiﬁcations in the
bottom ability quartile. This explains the high standard errors. Furthermore, there are
few observations with very high ability and low-level or no qualiﬁcations at all. The
returns to ability (slope) appear to be positive whenever a suﬃciently large number of
observations can be found. However, the wage eﬀect of qualiﬁcations does not seem to
be so homogeneous. For example, no signiﬁcant diﬀerences can be found between low
and mid qualiﬁcation for low ability levels. The estimated wage gains from obtaining a
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Figure 3: Changes in returns to ability: By education
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NOTE: Predicted wages for each education level and ability, with their conﬁdence intervals.
Based on a spline regression of log hourly real wages (pr=Jan 2001) on g, which is calculated
from ability scores at the age of 11(10), by highest level of academic qualiﬁcation. Sample:
Working males with valid wage, ability and qualiﬁcations data. Notice the rising gap between
high and mid educated individuals in BCS for low-intermediate ability levels.
mid-level qualiﬁcation are restricted to the remaining three quartiles.
We only ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant impact of higher education above the median
value of g, although the beneﬁt of higher education reduces as we move to the very end
of the top quartile. It is important to note that for an individual at the 75th percentile (g
slightly below 1) the importance of obtaining additional qualiﬁcations is most evident.
With the caveats mentioned about making cross-cohort inferences about changes over
time, it is nonetheless interesting to compare the two charts in ﬁgure 3. The sorting prob-
lem in the BCS data is less severe. There are many individuals with high qualiﬁcations
who are in the bottom ability quartile, although it is certainly true that they are located
closer to the 25th percentile. The eﬀect of mid-level qualiﬁcations appears to be concen-
trated at the middle of the ability distribution, thus suggesting an overall reduction in
returns to these qualiﬁcations. Probably the most notable ﬁnding relates to the stronger
eﬀect of high level qualiﬁcations relative to mid-level ones. Positive returns to these higher
level qualiﬁcations can now be found even for relatively low levels of ability, as the gap
widens between the high and middle education ‘clouds’ for predicted wages.
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So far, important interactions have been found between cognitive ability and education.
We have also provided evidence on the role of parental socio-economic characteristics
in determining children’s cognitive progression and educational attainment. One issue
remains unexplored as yet however. How do parental social class and income inﬂuence an
individual’s return to their cognitive ability and education level? Do these unmeritocratic
inﬂuences extend themselves beyond endowments in childhood and youth? Have any
signiﬁcant changes occurred between cohorts?
Figure 4: Changes in returns to ability: By income groups
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NOTE: Predicted wages for extreme parental income quintiles and ability, with their con-
ﬁdence intervals. Based on spline regression of log hourly real wages (pr=Jan 2001) on g
calculated from ability scores at the age of 11(10), for the two extreme parental income
quintiles. Sample: Working males with valid wage, ability and qualiﬁcations data. Cohort
members born to parents in top income quintile (at age 16) compared to those in bottom
quintile. Notice the widening gap in BCS between income groups at intermediate/high
ability levels.
Figure 4 examines the returns to ability using the same type of spline speciﬁcation
used earlier in this section. Instead of separating groups by educational level, it depicts
only workers whose parents were in the top and bottom income quintiles when they were
16. This tries to capture the overall eﬀect of the primary variables (family background
and ability) on wages. For the earlier NCDS cohort, returns to ability are fairly similar
for individuals from wealthy and poor backgrounds. In the later BCS cohort, the gap
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between the ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ proﬁles widens for intermediate/high ability levels. Returns
to ability for low income individuals now experience a massive increase a high levels of
ability, suggesting some sort of diﬀerential ‘threshold’ eﬀect.
These ﬁndings about income gaps and returns to cognitive ability by parental income
group are basically paralleled if one compares workers with fathers from high and low SES
groups, using their occupational classiﬁcation.39 These diﬀerences may also be further
investigated by estimating the log earnings-ability proﬁles for separate education and in-
come groups, as in ﬁgure 5. For less educated men, there are no substantial diﬀerences in
predicted wages between income groups in NCDS. In BCS, however, there are very few
observations of men from higher income families with very low or no qualiﬁcations at all.
For men with an intermediate education level, class diﬀerences have become more acute
almost everywhere in the ability distribution. Much of this widening gap is due to the
educational composition of the widely deﬁned ‘intermediate’ qualiﬁcation group. Higher
class individuals are more likely to have A-levels and this is reﬂected in higher predicted
wages for similar ability levels.
Finally, class diﬀerences in predicted wages for graduate men that were found in the
NCDS tend to disappear in BCS. However, few men from poor backgrounds have higher
education qualiﬁcations. It thus seems that higher education is a successful social leveller,
but access to it is not equally distributed in the population even after controlling for
ability.
Between the two cohorts, diﬀerences between those from poor and rich backgrounds
have shifted their main locus of inﬂuence down the ability distribution.40 Individuals from
lower income backgrounds who manage to get into higher education are now on a very
equal basis with their peers from richer backgrounds. However, diﬀerences based on family
income amongst those with intermediate level qualiﬁcations have become stronger. Further
analysis shows this may be due to the heterogeneity of qualiﬁcation levels within this
group, which includes good O-levels and A-levels.41 Individuals from richer backgrounds
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Figure 5: Changes in returns to ability: By income and education
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NOTE: NOTE: Predicted wages for extreme parental income quintiles, education levels and
ability, with their conﬁdence intervals. Based on spline regression of log hourly real wages
(pr=Jan 2001) on g calculated from ability scores at the age of 11(10), by highest academic
qualiﬁcation attainment. Sample: Working males with valid wage, ability and qualiﬁcations
data. Cohort members born to parents in top income quintile (at age 16) compared to those
in bottom quintile, for each education level: (0: No/low quals, 1: Mid. quals, 2: High
quals).
are more likely to acquire A-level qualiﬁcations, as opposed to vocational qualiﬁcations
or just O levels. A levels also yield a higher return in the labour market. Generally, this
evidence supports the view that social class eﬀects are now principally mediated through
educational attainment. Higher returns to ability at lower levels of ability for those from
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richer families, whereas returns to g at high ability levels are higher for the poorer. Again,
this is consistent with the pattern of diﬀerentiated staying-on rates and access to higher
education for rich and poor students.
5 The determinants of cognitive ability
5.1 Meritocratic and unmeritocratic inﬂuences
Our analysis so far has been based on an assumption that ability scores at age 10/11 are a
reasonably good approximation to a child’s potential ability. However, to make inferences
about meritocracy based on these tests, we need to be sure that the ability measures them-
selves are not determined by unmeritocratic inﬂuences. However, as we already proved for
educational attainment, measures of ability attainment are indeed sensitive to parental
and other environmental inﬂuences, some of them possibly unmeritocratic. Parents in-
vest in their oﬀspring’s development from as early as they become aware of conception,
thus making measurements of genuine ability potential unfeasible.42 Nonetheless, since
our data provide earlier measurements of individual ability, we are able to analyse the
determinants of ability progression in childhood and any changes across cohorts. This will
enable us to make more deﬁnitive statements about any increase in meritocracy in the
UK.
Mobility in the distribution of cognitive attainment throughout childhood has already
been well documented in these data by Feinstein (1998, 2000). Using assessments of chil-
dren’s intellectual, emotional and personal development at the ages of 22 and 42 months
and 5 and 10 years-old (provided in the BCS data), he examines the degree of correla-
tion between ‘ability’ at these diﬀerent stages. The 42 month ability rank appears to
provide a fairly stable guide to a child’s later position in the distribution, although there
is a substantial degree of mobility. In fact the association of test rank with social class,
for example, appears to strengthen with age, leading to increased polarisation by socio-
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economic status.43 One possible explanation of course for this result is that parents from a
higher social class inﬂuence their children’s cognitive ability progression by spending more
resources on them.44
Here we analyze the determinants of the measures of cognitive ability we used in the
previous sections. We start with a simple linear speciﬁcation of the ability index at 11 as
a function of parental characteristics and early attainment indices.45 Unfortunately, there
is no age overlapping between early measures for NCDS7 and BCS5 which makes these
measures less comparable. Table 8 provides the full estimation results of the expected
index at 11 conditional on earlier ability and parental characteristics.46
Results suggest that measures of parental SES play an important role in determining
the ability index at 11.47 The coeﬃcient on the earlier ability measure can be considered
as the partial correlation between the earlier and later ability indices. This value is consid-
erable and statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting a considerable degree of serial correlation.
However, it is important to note that this coeﬃcient is smaller than one and thus allows
for a substantial degree of mobility in the distribution of ability.
The simple fact that parental SES characteristics have an important eﬀect on ability
progression does not prove alone that the distribution of cognitive ability is the result of
unmeritocratic inﬂuences. However, if earlier ability has become a less eﬀective predictor
of later ability and parental SES variables have become better predictors for the later
cohort, this would imply that British society may have become less, rather than more,
meritocratic over time.48
Assuming that the earlier ability index for BCS at 5 is a proxy for the unmeasured
ability of BCS children at 7 (and thus comparable to NCDS), table 8 suggests that early
ability has become a less important determinant of later ability by a large factor, for
both boys and girls. Conversely, parental log income and SES appear to have become
more correlated with ability at 11. Measurement error (driven by the unobservability of
BCS ability at 7) may be responsible for these cohort diﬀerences. Greater measurement
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Table 8: Determinants of ability index at 11/10
Men Women
NCDS BCS NCDS BCS
Coef. R.S.E. Coef. R.S.E. Coef. R.S.E. Coef. R.S.E.
Cognitive ability index 5/7 0.577 0.016 0.349 0.028 0.576 0.014 0.435 0.023
Father’s SES at 11/10
Professional 0.088 0.083 0.525 0.138 0.081 0.088 0.340 0.141
Intermediate 0.122 0.061 0.306 0.128 0.224 0.066 0.181 0.116
Skilled non-man 0.121 0.064 0.352 0.134 0.202 0.069 0.079 0.119
Skilled manual 0.088 0.050 0.219 0.118 0.120 0.059 0.167 0.106
Semi-skilled 0.062 0.054 0.210 0.128 0.089 0.060 -0.016 0.112
Father’s SES at birth
Professional 0.100 0.093 0.355 0.136 0.266 0.080 0.112 0.126
Intermediate 0.036 0.060 0.121 0.128 0.132 0.058 0.248 0.103
Skilled non-man 0.060 0.058 0.161 0.122 0.098 0.057 0.180 0.099
Skilled manual 0.008 0.044 0.026 0.108 0.114 0.045 0.096 0.086
Semi-skilled 0.005 0.052 0.011 0.114 0.082 0.051 0.118 0.091
Parental education
Father middle 0.095 0.043 0.133 0.062 0.119 0.037 0.111 0.059
Father high 0.172 0.057 -0.006 0.082 0.133 0.053 0.089 0.076
Mother middle 0.159 0.035 0.125 0.058 0.077 0.032 0.126 0.054
Mother high 0.123 0.059 0.239 0.088 0.235 0.053 0.102 0.076
Father’s age at birth -0.003 0.004 0.011 0.005 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.005
Mother’s age at birth 0.006 0.004 -0.008 0.006 0.008 0.003 0.001 0.005
Father’s interest in ed.
Middle 0.189 0.047 0.132 0.130 0.097 0.046 0.327 0.113
High 0.351 0.054 0.301 0.140 0.275 0.054 0.331 0.117
Does not know 0.132 0.048 0.125 0.131 0.075 0.047 0.159 0.110
Mother’s interest in ed.
Middle 0.057 0.049 0.258 0.131 0.165 0.048 0.266 0.118
High 0.223 0.055 0.512 0.140 0.328 0.056 0.483 0.124
Does not know 0.064 0.059 0.221 0.143 0.075 0.061 0.211 0.128
Log parental income 0.079 0.024 0.115 0.038 0.059 0.023 0.085 0.035
Log number of children -0.121 0.025 -0.052 0.052 -0.096 0.023 -0.025 0.047
Constant -0.637 0.131 -1.485 0.263 -0.919 0.134 -1.371 0.239
Number of obs 3015 1734 2892 1771
R-squared 0.5849 0.385 0.6128 0.4064
NOTE: OLS estimations of expected ability score at 11/10, conditional on earlier
attainment and additional family parental characteristics.
error of early ability in BCS could attenuate the estimated coeﬃcient. However, it is
possible to give an approximate value of the extent of measurement error that would be
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required to account for the observed cohort diﬀerences. Thus for BCS, the unobserved
ability index that would be measured at age 7 following an identical procedure to that in
NCDS can be written as g5,i = g7,i + ui. The asymptotic bias for the estimated coeﬃcient
βˆ in a regression of ability at 10 on ability at 5, where β satisﬁes g10,i = βg7,i + i, is
determined by: βσ2u/(σ
2
u + σ
2
g7
), whenever u and  are independent and  is independent
of the unobserved g7,i.
49 Under the assumption that the true β has not changed between
cohorts, it is possible to infer the minimum proportion of the variance of g5,i which is due
to error in order to fully explain the observed changes in estimated βˆ:
σ2u
σ2u + σ
2
g7
=
β − βˆBCS
β
.
Even though g at 7 for NCDS can also be measured with error, the key issue here is the
existence of diﬀerential measurement error that could possibly explain the diﬀerences in
the coeﬃcients. Therefore one can ﬁx β = βˆNCDS. These calculations reveal that no less
than a ﬁgure between one third and one fourth of the total variation in measured g at 5
in BCS should be due to additional measurement error. The large diﬀerences in estimated
coeﬃcients thus suggest that measurement error does not seem to be the only reason for
the observed decline in the relationship between earlier and later child ability.
We have also tried diﬀerent models to explain progression throughout childhood in
the ability distribution. We have estimated the conditional probability of being in a given
ability quartile at 11, conditional on being in a given ability quartile earlier and being part
of a family in a given SES group. Changes across cohorts in the gap between higher and
lower SES groups can identify our parameter of interest if SES and cohort ﬁxed eﬀects
remove the type of measurement errors discussed above. The conclusion is always that
better oﬀ children ﬁnd it easier in the more recent cohort both to keep their initial high
position in the ability distribution and to move upwards when their initial position is
low.50
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5.2 Aspects of intergenerational transmission of ability
Of course no discussion about meritocracy or social mobility in Britain would be complete
without an analysis of the extent to which parents transmit their cognitive ability (innate
and acquired) to their children. To discuss properly the complex issue of intergenerational
transmission of ability would require a separate paper. Furthermore, our data does not
allow us to reproduce the cross-cohort comparative analysis carried out in previous sections
in relation to intergenerational transmissions. Here we merely seek to provide a very
approximate measurement of the statistical association between parental and child ability
scores in the same way the intergenerational income mobility literature examines the
correlation between parental and child income levels.
We follow Gregg and Machin (1997) in their examination of the Peabody Individual
Achievement Test Scores (PIAT) on maths and reading available from the children of the
NCDS cohort members.51 In table 9, we provide a detailed analysis of the relationship
between parental and child ability, and the robustness of this relationship to the inclusion
of education and labour market characteristics of the parents.
We only consider information on the parent who is a cohort member, ignoring infor-
mation on his/her partner.52 In order to minimise the problem associated with the fact
that the children of the NCDS cohort were tested at diﬀerent ages, we include a cubic
polynomial of the children’s age.53
Our estimates suggest strong ability transmission eﬀects from parents to their oﬀspring,
particularly by mothers. It is remarkable to ﬁnd that cognitive ability measured at age 11
and age 7 has a signiﬁcant impact on the ability of the respondent’s own children. The
fact that in most circumstances both parental age 7 and 11 scores are signiﬁcant indicates
that part of the cognitive progression which happens throughout the parent’s childhood is
also transmitted to the child. Parents’ school qualiﬁcations also play an important role in
determining reading scores, with some impact on maths scores too. It is also important
to note that social class eﬀects on children’s attainment are not removed completely by
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including measures of parental education and ability. 54 Moreover, children of unemployed
fathers appear to have lower maths and reading scores. We do not ﬁnd any negative impact
of maternal work on scores.55
Table 9: Determinants of oﬀspring’s ability scores
Reading scores Maths scores
Father Mother Father Mother
Occupation
Professional 0.144 6.027 -6.882 3.387
(3.549) (3.861) (2.475) (2.693)
Managerial/interm 0.567 2.818 -3.977 3.074
(2.611) (1.518) (1.967) (1.192)
Skilled non manual -0.909 2.802 -4.671 3.402
(2.682) (1.436) (2.010) (1.160)
Skilled manual -0.277 0.313 -5.036 2.191
(2.512) (1.810) (1.900) (1.803)
Semi-skilled -0.809 1.573 -6.418 1.356
(2.637) (1.461) (2.069) (1.199)
Activity status
Part-time work 8.211 1.653 6.063 1.099
(3.577) (0.922) (2.214) (0.689)
Looking after family -0.529 0.140 0.612 -1.288
(7.688) (1.048) (3.207) (0.767)
Unemployment -3.729 2.046 -1.526 2.761
(1.843) (2.562) (1.246) (2.274)
Other -4.470 5.177 0.052 3.486
(3.355) (2.538) (2.388) (2.397)
School qualiﬁcations
CSEs 3.245 -1.014 2.172 -0.080
(1.430) (1.287) (1.138) (1.018)
< 5 O-levels 3.282 0.830 2.070 -0.329
(1.670) (1.296) (1.152) (0.879)
≥ 5 O-levels 6.469 1.766 3.361 1.459
(2.086) (1.447) (1.530) (1.060)
A-levels 3.950 4.504 2.641 1.352
(2.491) (1.626) (1.872) (1.393)
Continues next page...
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Reading scores Maths scores
Father Mother Father Mother
Post-school qualiﬁcations
Low vocational 2.476 1.600 1.643 0.383
(1.348) (0.841) (0.927) (0.659)
Mid vocational 1.466 -0.379 -0.494 -2.823
(1.443) (1.295) (1.022) (1.095)
High vocational 2.700 0.443 0.650 0.309
(1.604) (1.155) (1.294) (0.900)
Degree+ 1.566 -3.351 -0.187 -0.058
(2.796) (2.056) (2.195) (1.924)
Ability variables
Ability index at 7 1.239 1.503 1.017 0.081
(0.789) (0.581) (0.525) (0.456)
Ability index at 11 0.668 2.718 0.128 2.379
(0.902) (0.686) (0.706) (0.522)
Antisocial index -0.118 -0.089 -1.056 -0.220
(0.542) (0.435) (0.381) (0.330)
Constant -50.251 -69.193 -34.384 -65.335
(16.482) (9.977) (12.051) (7.276)
Observations 574 1033 579 1036
R-squared 0.68 0.74 0.77 0.78
Ability F-stat 2.61 21.69 4.88 15.28
Ability P-value 0.05 0.00 0.0024 0.00
NOTE: Ordinary least squares regression of PIAT maths and reading scores from
cohort members’ children tested in 1991. Regression includes a cubic polynomial in
the child’s age. Standard errors robust to clustering by parental identity are within
parentheses.
6 Conclusions
Our extensive empirical investigation suggests, in broad terms, that Britain has not be-
come more meritocratic in recent decades. Speciﬁcally we investigated whether ability has
become a more important determinant of educational achievement and then whether it
has a greater role in determining labour market success, principally earnings.
The key results can be summarised as follows:
1. The impact of cognitive ability on educational attainment has actually decreased,
while the role of parental social class and income has increased. In other words, it
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is not the most able who have beneﬁted from the expansion of the UK education
system but rather the most privileged.
2. As has been found in the US, cognitive skills are an important determinant of British
labour market success, independent of any eﬀect of educational attainment. Speciﬁ-
cally, those with higher cognitive skills are less likely to be inactive and unemployed
and, in the case of women, more likely to be in full-time, rather than part-time, work.
Cognitive skills also have an impact on wages. The pricing of cognitive ability diﬀers
between men and women, with women’s ability appearing to be the more valuable
partly due to participation eﬀects.
3. Returns to cognitive ability increase over the lifetime and appear to have slightly
increased over the decade of the nineties. The literature suggests that the strong
increase in returns to education throughout the eighties slowed down during this
period. Our estimates referring to this period are based on very young individuals
and we can only ﬁnd a small increase in returns to ability. These conclusions come of
course with caveats about the problems of making inferences about changes in returns
over time with panel data derived from only two cohorts and limited longitudinal
observations.
4. We also consider the impact of ability on wages for diﬀerent social groups and edu-
cational levels. The results suggest that, at least in terms of higher education, the
expansion of the education system in Britain has disproportionately beneﬁted the
higher social classes. Less able children from higher social classes are more likely
to participate in higher education and they then go on to beneﬁt from the on-going
increase in the labour market demand for graduates. Nevertheless, higher education
appears to have become a successful class leveller in that, conditional on achieving
a degree, we do not ﬁnd diﬀerences in the price of cognitive skills for diﬀerent social
classes.
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5. We have shown that children’s cognitive skills can change throughout childhood.
However, children from higher social classes and wealthier families are more likely
to move up the ability distribution, when their initial attainment is low. They are
also more likely than poorer children to remain at the higher end of the ability
distribution, when their initial attainment is high. Not only is social class important
in determining a child’s position in the ability distribution (and their movement up
and down it) but there is also evidence that the cognitive gap between children from
higher and lower social classes has widened between the two cohorts considered here.
It could be argued that this is entirely due to a higher association between better
parental genes and parental social class, as if higher meritocracy had been achieved in the
cohorts of NCDS and BCS members’ parents. This argument cannot explain observed co-
hort changes in the patterns of children’s ability progression. Additionally, as our NCDS
estimates of intergenerational transmission of ability suggest, observed correlations be-
tween the ability of parents and their oﬀspring, though considerable, cannot support the
view that parental ability is the only determinant of children’s scores.
These ﬁndings are broadly at odds with hypothesis that Britain has become an in-
creasingly meritocratic society, unless we are willing to expand our notion of merit to
include parental socioeconomic achievements. The fact that social class has become a
more important determinant of educational achievement is particularly worrying. During
this period there was considerable reform to the English education system, most of which
was designed to make the system less class-ridden. For example, the 1958 cohort in our
data would have experienced an extremely selective education system with the widespread
use of ‘grammar’ schools.56 The 20% of pupils who attended these schools were supposed
to be the most able students but in fact social class was an important predictor of whether
a student attended a grammar school and the educational opportunities for those who
did not make it into grammars were extremely limited. Furthermore, less than one in ten
students stayed on into higher education at that time. The 1970s cohort, by contrast,
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experienced mostly ‘comprehensive’ schools, attended by students of all abilities. Further-
more, the education system had expanded and around one in three students would have
stayed on into higher education. Yet this expansion appears to have disproportionately
beneﬁted the higher social classes. Ability actually plays a less important role for the
younger cohort. Many explanations are possible, not least of which is that by removing
‘elitist’ ability related selection mechanisms in the system, such as grammar schools and
streaming students by ability, we have actually enabled parental social class to become a
more important determinant of success.
On the other hand, it appears that the British labour market has become only marginally
more meritocratic, in the sense that cognitive ability has become more important in de-
termining earnings and other indicators of labour market success. Yet even this ﬁnding
is undermined by our result that social class has become a more important determinant
of cognitive skills. Certain economic developments and reforms, such as skill biased tech-
nical change and the reduction in union power, may have made individual ability a more
important determinant of labour market success, but if cognitive ability is increasingly
determined by social class, one can hardly describe British society as more meritocratic.
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Notes
1A meritocratic society could be one in which individual success depended purely on
other characteristics, such as physical strength. This illustrates the point that the concept
of meritocracy is essentially normative and dependent on cultural norms. Our society
lauds both eﬀort and intelligence and thus we believe that an individual’s status should
be determined by these characteristics speciﬁcally.
2The term ‘meritocracy’ term was actually coined by Michael Young in his book The
Rise of the Meritocracy (1958) to warn against a society ridden by stratiﬁcation according
to the results of early childhood testing. It has since been intepreted in many diﬀerent
ways (Breen and Goldthorpe (2001).
3See the unresolved debate about the link between genes, intelligence and socio-economic
outcomes (Jensen (1968, 1969); Herrnstein and Murray (1994); Goldberger and Manski
(1995); Heckman (1995).)
4The data used in this paper have already been applied to other aspects of the re-
lationship between socio-economic background, cognitive ability and socio-economic out-
comes (Breen and Goldthorpe (1999,2001); Chevalier and Lanot(2002); Currie and Thomas
(1999); Dearden (1999a,1999b); Dearden et al (1997); Dearden et al (2000); Feinstein
and Symons (1997) ; Harmon and Walker (2000); McCulloch and Joshi (2000); Saunders
(1997)). Blanden et al (2002) have also considered intergenerational income mobility in
these data. There is also a related literature on social mobility (Erikson and Goldthorpe
(1985); Saunders (1997); Breen and Goldthorpe (1999,2001) and McKnight (2000), to cite
just a few.
5This mainly refers to the National Longitudinal Study of Youth of 1979, but also
includes the NLS of the High School Class of 1972 and the High School and Beyond panel
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of the class of 1980.
6Moreover, the extent of missing data in ability*education cells is subsequently reduced
though not eliminated.
7Although this conclusion –on earnings– depends on various assumptions made to over-
come the problems of making inferences about changes over time with panel data derived
from only two cohorts and limited longitudinal observations.
8For example, many studies of social mobility are often wrongly interpreted as provid-
ing evidence of unmeritocratic trends, on the basis that parental SES strongly determines
their oﬀspring’s own SES. This is not necessarily the case, to the extent that ability is
determined by genes and early environment. Conversely, evidence of weak parental SES
eﬀects on wages after conditioning on education is still compatible with little meritocracy
in the educational system. In other words if parental social class determines educational
attainment, SES may not have any additional eﬀect on wages but society is still unmeri-
tocratic.
9There is a substantial literature about the eﬀects of family resources on children’s
educational attainment and subsequent labour market performance. This literature has
focused on the eﬀects of parental income as well as social class and has more recently
extended to consider school quality, neighbourhood characteristics, etc. See the literature
review by Haveman and Wolfe (1995) on the determinants of children’s attainment.
10The most widely cited study of this type is the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY).
11Some of these could be considered as unmeritocratic, such as those following from
better living conditions, etc., whereas others are more subject to debate about their nature,
such as the transmission of more socially desirable values from parents and so on.
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12The extent of overlapping in terms of age months for both cohorts is quite considerable,
as the data collection process extends itself for periods longer than one year in both surveys.
13NCDS test scores at the age of 11 were (i) reading, (ii) maths ability, (iii) non-verbal
general ability, (iv) verbal general ability and (v) copying designs. BCS test scores at 10
include (i) maths, (ii) reading and (iii) British Ability Scale test of general ability.
14As we will show later, there have been substantial changes in the production of cog-
nitive development between both cohorts over that particular age period.
15Most papers using these data (NCDS and BCS) restrict themselves to using the reading
and maths quintiles, neglecting important information from the general ability scores.
Breen and Goldthorpe (2001) instead argue that the general ability scores in both NCDS
and BCS, although diﬀerent, are a good proxy for IQ scores (Douglas (1967) and Elliot et al
(1978)). However, Breen and Goldthorpe (2001) ignore potentially important information
contained in maths and reading scores.
16We do not interpret it as an absolute measure of cognitive skills. The average level
of cognitive skills may have increased between cohorts as the result, for example, of in-
creasing levels of schooling or simply increasing focus on testing within the educational
establishment. See Flynn (1987).
17Copying designs is commonly associated with a more primary type of ability that
relates more to brain-motor coordination rather than more elaborate ‘cognitive’ mental
processes.
18This supports the hypothesis that the contribution of maths scores to g, for example, is
basically the same in NCDS and BCS, and hence we are not treating diﬀerent components
of ability diﬀerently across cohorts.
19Individuals with just CSEs and lower grade O levels equate, approximately, to high
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school dropouts in the US.
205 + O levels equate, approximately, to US high school graduates.
21A levels equate, approximately, to high school plus good SAT’s or the ﬁrst year of
college.
22This category refers to college graduates.
23Our results are consistent with Blanden, Gregg and Machin (2002) but diﬀer somewhat
from those in Chevalier and Lanot (forthcoming) in that we do ﬁnd evidence of signiﬁcant
changes in the determinants of education between cohorts. They use a diﬀerent education
measure for the BCS cohort strictly based on the age 26 survey, implemented through a
postal self-completion questionnaire and indeed subject to diﬀerential attrition relative to
the NCDS data. Their speciﬁcations also diﬀer: speciﬁcally, they only control for reading
and maths scores and instead of age 11 NCDS scores, they use age 7 test scores from
NCDS that are less comparable to age 10 BCS scores.
24If we exclude parental income at 16 to increase the sample size, the role of father’s SES
diﬀerences also appears to become more important. If this same estimation is performed
on the reduced sample with valid parental income, the results are basically identical.
25This scheme is called the Education Maintenance Allowance, see Dearden et al (2002).
26Full results available from the authors on request.
27We can think of physical and mental health beneﬁts, prestige, happiness, etc.
28We have also investigated the role of cognitive ability in occupational choice but we
could not ﬁnd any type of implementable exclusion restriction that allowed identiﬁcation
of a full model of occupational choice as in Cawley et al (1998b). Breen and Goldthorpe
(2001) argue that there has been a decline in the eﬀects of ‘merit’ variables, strengthening
47
the association between class origins and destinations. We prefer to focus our attention
on measures of socioeconomic success that are less subject to changes over time in their
interpretation as ‘success’ indicators.
29Both dates refer to similar economic circumstances in the British economy, charac-
terised by positive rates of economic growth and declining unemployment rates. Attrition
in our data leads to marginally lower rates of unemployment and non-participation relative
to the UK economy. Comparisons based on alternative earlier months show similar results
and are not displayed here. There is no evidence of diﬀerentiated recall problems between
cohorts for the purposes of these estimates.
30It is of course an arguable point whether this language is appropriate for women
choosing to be out of the workforce.
31Results are available on request.
32Full results are available on request.
33Cawley et al (1996) also ﬁnd that female returns to measured cognitive ability are
higher for all racial groups and returns to black males are systematically higher that
those of their white and hispanic counterparts. These diﬀerences become stronger when
controlling for additional characteristics.
34This measure is based on the work histories available from cohort members for each
month after their sixteenth birthday. We have chosen years of education in this case to
ease the depiction of returns over time, though similar results are obtained using highest
education level instead.
35Detailed cross-tabulations of ability and educational attainment are also available on
request.
36Thus, for an individual i with education h, age a, cohort c and cognitive ability g within
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quartile q, we express E[logwi,a,c,h,g] = αa,c,q,h+βa,c,q,h·gi, with the continuity constraints at
g = g0.25, g = g0.50 and g = g0.75. Under this ﬂexible speciﬁcation, we are able to identify re-
turns to education for NCDS at 33, E[logw33,NCDS,h′,g]−E[logw33,NCDS,h,g], obtain a lower
bound for the unobserved E[logw33,BCS,h′,g] − E[logw33,BCS,h,g] from E[logw30,BCS,h′,g] −
E[logw30,BCS,h,g] when h
′ > h, for all values of g. A lower bound for changes in returns
to education then follows. Similarly, returns to ability for a given educational level can
be similarly estimated and their changes lower-bounded, building on the lessons about
non-decreasing average returns to ability and education from ﬁgure 2.
37These have been calculated as the predicted value plus/minus twice the standard error
of the prediction.
38Large standard errors in these areas reﬂect this problem too.
39Results available on request.
40These ﬁndings are reproduced by deﬁning social class in terms of parental socioeco-
nomic occupation. These results are available on request.
41Results available on request.
42Studies on diﬀerences between monozygotic twins reared apart are based on the strong
assumption of no interactions between genes and environment. Other complications follow
from the small sample sizes available, their representativeness and the lack of substantial
variation in environments.
43Feinstein (forthcoming) also shows that although children are already stratiﬁed by
social class at early tests (in terms of higher average rank positions for higher SES levels),
the stratiﬁcation becomes more extreme as time passes. The importance of SES seems
to be conﬁrmed by the fact that, on average, children from high SES with early low
attainment overtake low SES children with higher early attainment in later ability tests.
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44See also Feinstein, Robertson and Symons (1999).
45For NCDS at age 7, children were administered the following tests: (i) ‘Southgate
reading test’ (Southgate), (ii) ‘Copying designs test’, (iii) ‘Draw a man test’ (Goodenough),
(iv) ‘Problem arithmetic’ (Pringle), (v) ‘Word test’. BCS children were tested at age 5:
(i) ‘Schonell graded reading test’, (ii) ‘Copying designs’, (iii) ‘Human ﬁgure drawing’, (iv)
‘English Picture Vocabulary Test’, (v) ‘Complete a proﬁle’. The ability index for each
cohort was also derived using principal components of these ability scores.
46This speciﬁcation also includes parental income, which refers to age 16, so income
should be interpreted as an additional control for permanent family income. Unfortunately,
there are no earlier comparable measures of income available in the data. The coeﬃcient
on earlier ability is unaﬀected by diﬀerent speciﬁcations, such as those excluding income
at 16.
47The number of siblings has a negative impact on cognitive development, whereas
parental education and interest in the child’s education help improve a child’s cognitive
performance.
48This statement requires that parental SES characteristics are not more related to
aspects of ability that can be transmitted to their oﬀspring through genes. This is a less
restrictive assumption than other restrictions imposed in the literature. In addition, we
also control for parental interest in child’s education.
49It is possible to extend this discussion by allowing additional controls so that the latter
may hold true.
50These results are also available upon request.
51Currie and Thomas (1995) performed a similar exercise for the U.S.
52It is possible that the ability transmission mechanism is diﬀerent for mothers and
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fathers, either for genetic or environmental reasons. Basic correlations by age groups also
suggest that the mother’s inﬂuence is higher. Results available on request.
53This variable has a precision of one month. It is important to note that by using
data on a single cohort, older children tend to have parents with lower ability scores and
less favourable parental socio-economic backgrounds. This eﬀect is combined with the fact
that parent-child ability correlations appear to increase with age. To keep things as simple
as possible, we have chosen to include the age polynomial and ability variables without
any interactions. Instrumenting child age did not produce substantially diﬀerent results.
54Signs for father’s SES eﬀect on child’s math ability look opposed to what one might
have expected, due to substantial sorting between education and occupational class. This
result conﬁrms some of the ﬁndings by Currie and Thomas (1995) in their study of the
eﬀects of mothers’ AFQT scores on the results of their children Picture and Vocabulary
tests.
55Using data from the British Household Panel, which does not include parental ability,
Ermisch and Francesconi (2000) ﬁnd negative eﬀects of maternal work on child’s educa-
tional attainment.
56The grammar school system was designed such that the majority of school children
(approximately 80%) would have attended secondary modern schools where they were
not expected to stay in education beyond the age of 16. 20% of school children, dis-
proportionately from middle or upper class backgrounds, were sent to grammar schools
where they were expected to remain in school at least until age 18 or perhaps stay on into
higher education.
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Referee Appendix
Table 10: Probability of obtaining a higher education qualiﬁca-
tion: By income and ability group
Men
Income Ability quartiles
quintiles Q1 (lowest) Q2 Q3 Q4 (highest)
58 70 58 70 58 70 58 70
Q1 0.028 0.024 0.087 0.198 0.169 0.182 0.353 0.431
(lowest) 178 126 172 101 136 88 133 58
Q2 0.025 0.082 0.094 0.128 0.187 0.198 0.430 0.419
163 159 139 188 139 192 135 191
Q3 0.024 0.085 0.082 0.211 0.235 0.313 0.452 0.531
164 59 183 71 179 80 177 96
Q4 0.025 0.045 0.082 0.177 0.208 0.369 0.503 0.630
118 44 184 79 192 111 195 181
Q5 0.011 0.080 0.181 0.220 0.246 0.397 0.595 0.764
(highest) 93 25 105 50 187 63 257 178
Women
Ability quartiles
Q1 (lowest) Q2 Q3 Q4 (highest)
58 70 58 70 58 70 58 70
Q1 0.043 0.021 0.045 0.129 0.148 0.175 0.385 0.296
(lowest) 185 140 200 139 182 97 143 54
Q2 0.014 0.083 0.053 0.135 0.180 0.212 0.313 0.487
145 204 170 230 178 226 147 199
Q3 0.037 0.111 0.107 0.165 0.131 0.327 0.288 0.456
109 54 169 85 198 98 163 90
Q4 0.026 0.173 0.075 0.248 0.208 0.329 0.319 0.637
117 52 159 109 212 161 191 146
Q5 0.049 0.150 0.140 0.348 0.293 0.453 0.604 0.770
(highest) 81 20 129 46 205 106 273 174
NOTE: Proportion of individuals in each with a university degree or higher in ﬁrst
row. Number of observations in second row.
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Table 11: Probability of obtaining a higher education qualiﬁca-
tion: By social class and ability group
Men
Social Ability quartiles
class Q1 (lowest) Q2 Q3 Q4 (highest)
58 70 58 70 58 70 58 70
Professional 0.000 0.250 0.059 0.400 0.360 0.523 0.765 0.845
12 8 17 20 50 44 119 142
Intermediate 0.033 0.075 0.105 0.179 0.256 0.363 0.572 0.657
61 53 105 84 168 124 283 236
Skilled non-manual 0.053 0.119 0.071 0.222 0.212 0.341 0.506 0.561
75 59 99 108 132 164 174 244
Skilled manual 0.026 0.063 0.096 0.154 0.171 0.231 0.375 0.426
531 506 605 505 596 497 501 432
Semi-skilled 0.017 0.067 0.075 0.117 0.178 0.182 0.302 0.398
174 195 147 162 107 148 106 108
Unskilled 0.013 0.047 0.096 0.086 0.131 0.081 0.404 0.194
154 106 104 58 61 37 52 31
Women
Social class Q1 (lowest) Q2 Q3 Q4 (highest)
58 70 58 70 58 70 58 70
Professional 0.000 0.167 0.095 0.536 0.443 0.571 0.688 0.794
3 6 21 28 61 56 112 136
Intermediate 0.030 0.204 0.141 0.196 0.235 0.392 0.510 0.653
33 49 92 107 179 153 312 245
Skilled non-manual 0.056 0.148 0.109 0.218 0.188 0.273 0.445 0.611
54 61 101 119 138 183 155 198
Skilled manual 0.026 0.093 0.068 0.139 0.179 0.241 0.373 0.451
465 485 635 606 698 573 502 412
Semi-skilled 0.021 0.070 0.071 0.161 0.139 0.213 0.265 0.344
146 187 154 199 151 155 102 93
Unskilled 0.041 0.044 0.068 0.130 0.159 0.055 0.270 0.200
146 91 132 69 82 55 37 25
NOTE: Proportion of individuals in each with a university degree or higher in ﬁrst
row. Number of observations in second row.
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Table 12: Returns to qualiﬁcations and ability: NCDS
NCDS-MEN(23) NCDS-MEN(33) NCDS-MEN(42)
Basic Extended Basic Extended Basic Extended
Coef. R.S.E. Coef. R.S.E. Coef. R.S.E. Coef. R.S.E. Coef. R.S.E. Coef. R.S.E.
Aca.NVQ1 0.044 0.024 0.022 0.023 0.129 0.024 0.097 0.025 0.132 0.026 0.099 0.026
Aca.NVQ2 0.083 0.022 0.027 0.020 0.222 0.023 0.134 0.025 0.245 0.024 0.148 0.025
Aca.NVQ3 0.140 0.029 0.054 0.027 0.375 0.035 0.244 0.038 0.475 0.038 0.322 0.041
Aca.NVQ4 0.120 0.026 0.025 0.026 0.449 0.027 0.307 0.031 0.485 0.031 0.322 0.035
Aca.NVQ5 0.138 0.043 0.044 0.043 0.477 0.038 0.323 0.042 0.672 0.057 0.486 0.059
Voc.NVQ1 0.002 0.024 -0.003 0.023 -0.010 0.025 -0.017 0.025 0.000 0.028 -0.002 0.028
Voc.NVQ2 0.040 0.020 0.039 0.019 -0.001 0.023 0.001 0.023 -0.047 0.026 -0.043 0.025
Voc.NVQ3 0.049 0.020 0.044 0.020 0.014 0.022 0.006 0.022 0.025 0.026 0.018 0.026
Voc.NVQ4 0.032 0.017 0.025 0.017 0.098 0.021 0.085 0.021 0.079 0.024 0.071 0.024
Voc.NVQ5 -0.041 0.070 -0.047 0.068 -0.028 0.085 -0.017 0.084 -0.205 0.072 -0.185 0.070
FatEdMid -0.020 0.025 -0.028 0.024 0.033 0.024 0.019 0.024 0.054 0.031 0.030 0.031
FatEdHig -0.020 0.030 -0.019 0.030 0.117 0.033 0.119 0.032 0.072 0.040 0.068 0.040
MotEdMid -0.003 0.022 -0.014 0.022 0.039 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.020 0.028 -0.001 0.028
MotEdHig -0.034 0.037 -0.042 0.037 -0.030 0.051 -0.046 0.052 0.080 0.050 0.073 0.050
SES I -0.029 0.039 -0.047 0.039 0.101 0.044 0.074 0.043 0.115 0.068 0.082 0.067
SES II -0.068 0.029 -0.080 0.030 0.019 0.034 -0.002 0.033 0.001 0.036 -0.034 0.035
SES III.1 0.003 0.023 -0.008 0.022 0.082 0.031 0.060 0.030 0.031 0.035 0.003 0.034
SES III.2 0.026 0.018 0.021 0.018 0.013 0.023 0.002 0.022 -0.023 0.026 -0.037 0.026
SES IV -0.021 0.023 -0.021 0.023 -0.057 0.030 -0.062 0.030 -0.113 0.033 -0.120 0.033
C.ability 0.050 0.011 0.077 0.010 0.098 0.012
Antis. -0.022 0.007 -0.031 0.008 -0.029 0.009
Interc. 1.654 0.025 1.710 0.022 1.916 0.028 2.004 0.029 2.031 0.032 2.131 0.033
Observ. 2995 2995 2767 2767 3385 3385
R-Sq. 0.025 0.042 0.203 0.229 0.188 0.213
NOTE: Dependent variable: Log hourly wages. OLS estimates. Sample of working men in each sweep.
Baseline category: No qualiﬁcations, unskilled manual father and parents without any qualiﬁcation.
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Table 13: Returns to qualiﬁcations and ability: BCS
BCS-MEN(21) BCS-MEN(26) BCS-MEN(30)
Basic Extended Basic Extended Basic Extended
Coef. R.S.E. Coef. R.S.E. Coef. R.S.E. Coef. R.S.E. Coef. R.S.E. Coef. R.S.E.
Aca.NVQ1 -0.099 0.077 -0.073 0.077 0.024 0.046 0.005 0.046 0.033 0.025 0.024 0.025
Aca.NVQ2 0.029 0.064 0.021 0.063 0.119 0.041 0.064 0.041 0.121 0.022 0.065 0.023
Aca.NVQ3 0.226 0.104 0.191 0.099 0.175 0.056 0.084 0.057 0.276 0.037 0.172 0.039
Aca.NVQ4 0.125 0.082 0.097 0.081 0.244 0.043 0.156 0.045 0.354 0.029 0.258 0.031
Aca.NVQ5 -0.272 0.080 -0.408 0.101 0.266 0.055 0.156 0.058 0.398 0.040 0.270 0.043
Voc.NVQ1 -0.049 0.080 -0.068 0.079 -0.057 0.030 -0.060 0.030 -0.022 0.025 -0.026 0.025
Voc.NVQ2 -0.094 0.065 -0.088 0.064 -0.036 0.033 -0.020 0.034 -0.041 0.023 -0.030 0.023
Voc.NVQ3 0.026 0.056 0.020 0.056 -0.020 0.032 -0.015 0.032 0.040 0.025 0.037 0.024
Voc.NVQ4 -0.037 0.064 -0.034 0.064 0.035 0.028 0.034 0.027 0.075 0.027 0.072 0.026
Voc.NVQ5 -0.549 0.143 -0.569 0.139 -0.201 0.059 -0.209 0.057 -0.169 0.059 -0.197 0.060
FatEdMid -0.082 0.049 -0.086 0.050 0.049 0.028 0.044 0.028 0.060 0.029 0.051 0.029
FatEdHig 0.061 0.079 0.064 0.079 0.063 0.038 0.055 0.037 0.030 0.043 0.028 0.043
MotEdMid 0.032 0.048 0.023 0.048 0.071 0.029 0.061 0.029 0.061 0.028 0.041 0.028
MotEdHig -0.014 0.160 -0.028 0.164 0.063 0.042 0.046 0.042 0.022 0.045 -0.001 0.044
SES I -0.008 0.145 -0.024 0.148 0.070 0.057 0.045 0.057 0.120 0.050 0.079 0.050
SES II -0.065 0.123 -0.082 0.126 0.047 0.041 0.024 0.041 0.091 0.040 0.060 0.040
SES III.1 -0.005 0.089 -0.030 0.090 0.086 0.039 0.069 0.039 0.126 0.034 0.097 0.034
SES III.2 0.046 0.077 0.038 0.076 0.049 0.036 0.041 0.036 0.052 0.028 0.043 0.027
SES IV -0.006 0.086 -0.016 0.086 -0.029 0.043 -0.027 0.043 0.020 0.032 0.016 0.031
C.ability 0.044 0.027 0.066 0.013 0.085 0.010
Antis. -0.030 0.021 -0.012 0.011 -0.008 0.008
Interc. 1.821 0.083 1.840 0.081 1.778 0.049 1.831 0.049 1.865 0.030 1.930 0.030
Observ. 333 333 2196 2196 3017 3017
R-Sq. 0.085 0.100 0.077 0.089 0.145 0.166
NOTE: OLS estimates. Sample of men at work in each sweep. Baseline category: No qualiﬁcations,
unskilled manual father and parents without any qualiﬁcation.
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Table 14: Probability of staying in original ability quartile: Cohort changes in
SES gap.
Children in lowest ability quartile at 7/5
Comparison Boys Girls
Father’s Prof vs Unskilled -0.037 -0.253
Social (0.178) (0.198)
Class Skilled man vs non manual 0.084 -0.014
(0.073) (0.088)
Parental Top vs bottom quintiles 0.260 0.488
Income (0.105) (0.087)
Quintiles Second vs fourth quintiles 0.129 0.0523
(0.071) (0.094)
Children in highest ability quartile at 7/5
Boys Girls
Father’s Prof vs Unskilled 0.208 0.242
Social (0.116) (0.107)
Class Skilled man vs non manual 0.082 0.061
(0.058) (0.059)
Parental Top vs bottom quintiles 0.146 0.087
Income (0.087) (0.086)
Quintiles Second vs fourth quintiles 0.102 0.046
(0.075) (0.073)
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Figure 6: Changes in returns to ability by education: All surveys
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NOTES: Based on spline regression of log hourly real wages (pr=Jan 2001) on g calculated from ability
scores at the age of 11(10), by highest level of academic qualiﬁcation. Sample: Working males with valid
wage, ability and qualiﬁcations data.
Figure 7: Changes in returns to ability: By social class
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NOTES: Based on spline regression of log hourly real wages (pr=Jan 2001) on g calculated from ability
scores at the age of 11(10), by highest level of academic qualiﬁcation. Sample: Working males with valid
wage, ability and qualiﬁcations data. Individuals with father in non-manual occupations compared to
children of mid and low-skilled manual workers.
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Figure 8: Changes in returns to ability: By education and social class
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NOTE: Based on spline regression of log hourly real wages (pr=Jan 2001) on g calculated from ability
scores at the age of 11(10), by highest level of academic qualiﬁcation. Sample: Working males with valid
wage, ability and qualiﬁcations data. Same class groups as in ﬁgure 7.
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